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The principal–agent problem (also known as agency dilemma or theory of agency) occurs when one person or entity (the "agent") is able to make decisions on behalf of, or that impact, another person or entity: the "principal". The dilemma exists because sometimes the agent is motivated to act in his own best interests rather than those of the principal. The agent-principal relationship is a useful analytic tool in political science and economics, but may also apply to other areas. Common examples of this relationship include corporate management (agent) and shareholders (principal), or politicians (agent) and voters (principal).〔(【引用サイトリンク】title=Agency Costs )〕 For another example, consider a dental patient (the principal) wondering whether his dentist (the agent) is recommending expensive treatment because it is truly necessary for the patient's dental health, or because it will generate income for the dentist. In fact the problem potentially arises in almost any context where one party is being paid by another to do something, whether in formal employment or a negotiated deal such as paying for household jobs or car repairs. The problem arises where the two parties have different interests and asymmetric information (the agent having more information), such that the principal cannot directly ensure that the agent is always acting in its (the principal's) best interests,〔 particularly when activities that are useful to the principal are costly to the agent, and where elements of what the agent does are costly for the principal to observe. Moral hazard and conflict of interest may arise. Indeed, the principal may be sufficiently concerned at the possibility of being exploited by the agent that he chooses not to enter into a transaction at all, when that deal would have actually been in both parties' best interests: a suboptimal outcome that lowers welfare overall. The deviation from the principal's interest by the agent is called "agency costs".〔''Pay Without Performance'' by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, Harvard University Press 2004 ((preface and introduction ))〕 Various mechanisms may be used to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal. In employment, employers (principal) may use piece rates/commissions, profit sharing, efficiency wages, performance measurement (including financial statements), the agent posting a bond, or the threat of termination of employment. ==Overview== The principal and agent theory emerged in the 1970s from the combined disciplines of economics and institutional theory. There is some contention as to who originated the theory, with theorists Stephen Ross and Barry Mitnick claiming its authorship.〔 Mitnick (2006) "The Origins of Agency Theory": http://www.pitt.edu/~mitnick/agencytheory/agencytheoryoriginrev11806r.htm〕 Ross is said to have originally described the dilemma in terms of a person choosing a flavor of ice-cream for someone whose tastes he does not know (''Ibid''). The most cited reference to the theory, however comes from Michael Jensen and William Meckling.〔 Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics (October), 3(4): 305-360. http://www.sfu.ca/~wainwrig/Econ400/jensen-meckling.pdf〕 The theory has come to extend well beyond economics or institutional studies to all contexts of information asymmetry, uncertainty and risk. In the context of law, principals do not know enough about whether (or to what extent) a contract has been satisfied, and they end up with agency costs. The solution to this information problem—closely related to the moral hazard problem—is to ensure the provision of appropriate incentives so agents act in the way principals wish. In terms of game theory, it involves changing the rules of the game so that the self-interested rational choices of the agent coincide with what the principal desires. Even in the limited arena of employment contracts, the difficulty of doing this in practice is reflected in a multitude of compensation mechanisms and supervisory schemes, as well as in critique of such mechanisms as e.g., Deming (1986) expresses in his Seven Deadly Diseases of management. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Principal–agent problem」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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